27 September 2010

Letter from Lhasa, number 206. (Dodds 2007): Geopolitics

Letter from Lhasa, number 206. (Dodds 2007): Geopolitics
by Roberto Abraham Scaruffi

Dodds, K., Geopolitics. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2007.
(Dodds 2007).
Klaus Dodds

This about 172-page [182 with references and index] pocket book tries to introduce the magmatic field geopolitics is.

Tightly speaking, one jumps into geopolitics each time politics deal with spaces. Since that generally happens in international relations [wherever one would like more or less space, or even, sometimes, a different use of one’s own space, there are inevitable quarrelling/problems and/or conflicts with other State entities], the international set is a privileged theatre for geopolitics. Although, actually, it would be possible to classify as geopolitics also spatial political disputes inside States. Secessions, as well as different administrative organisations inside States or regions or provinces, etc might be pertinently classifies as geopolitics.

For someone, or for many, geopolitics is synonym of or combined with strategic matters. If “geopolitics” becomes the “science” of map[-based] “strategic” evaluations, it perfectly combines with strategy as the “science” of conveniences or supposed such. A nonsense becomes complement to another nonsense. The point of view of (Dodds 2007) is probably different, although he inevitably and involuntarily shows that “geopolitics” is generally synonym of politicking, alias of myopically opportunistic conveniences.        

The last chapter, Chapter 6, perhaps involuntarily shows as “geopolitics” be matter of people’s brainwashing. Mass-media of the “free” world are tightly controlled in what the average brainwashed “brain” would call totalitarian- or Nazi- or Soviet-style. Geopolitics simply becomes, or already is, part of the choreography for deceiving people and for justifying whatever State/government craziness to which people have to submit.

Dodds, K., Geopolitics. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2007.

26 September 2010

Letter from Lhasa, number 205. (Lyon 1980): Bertolt Brecht in America

Letter from Lhasa, number 205. (Lyon 1980): Bertolt Brecht in America
by Roberto Abraham Scaruffi

Lyon, J. K., Bertolt Brecht in America, Princeton University Press, 1980.
(Lyon 1980).
James K. Lyon

We find Brecht in the USA in 1935-36 and, later, from 1941 to 1947. In this dense book, one may find detailed information about the Brecht’s life in the USA.  

Left Germany in 1933, Brecht was skilful in avoiding living stably in the USSR, not a really safe place for refugees, and for Soviet subjects too. Finally, when his European exile was too dangerous, he could reach the USA in 1941. His previous visit, 1935-36, had professional reasons.  

In this book, one may find reports on the usual FBI and U.S. xenophobia and other phobias relatively both to foreigners and to U.S. subjects.  

One may read this book posing oneself different questions. One may see as a supposedly difficult character was not always so difficult; he had enemies but also friends. There is also some news about his being perceived as a very sexy man despite various aspects against that. One may see how he successfully made fun of the U.S. House of Representative’s [which inquired also on him] anti-“communist” “activities”, and how, basically, he followed his passions and interests and he lived them despite other people oppositions.   

Was he a “proletarian” author? I am not sure and, in my opinion, it not at all relevant. He enjoyed himself navigating in an inevitable adverse world. By this book, on a period of his life, one may see how.

Lyon, J. K., Bertolt Brecht in America, Princeton University Press, 1980.

24 September 2010

Letter from Lhasa, number 204. (Pool 1997): Hitler and His Secret Partners

Letter from Lhasa, number 204. (Pool 1997): Hitler and His Secret Partners
by Roberto Abraham Scaruffi

Pool, J., Hitler and His Secret Partners. Contributions, Loot and Rewards, 1933-1945, Pocket Books, 1997.
(Pool 1997).
James Pool     

This is a work about the German history, during its Nazi, and also pre-Nazi, phase from the point of view of money, both money put in politics than State/government economic policies.

Not astonishingly, the highest classes paid and used politics and the same Hitler was an instrument of German highest interests and of their Army. The Army was the expression of the German oligarchies. The Army, with the economic oligarchies, had a key role in the Nazi movement and in its becoming formal government.  

The same Jewry’s liquidation, if for Hitler and others was a question and faith, for many others, big and small, was a question of interest. The system of the extermination camps conjugated extermination with slave labour for key German industries. There were, in addition, also the interests linked with the expropriation of the Jews.

War, or anyway expansion, was, for Germany, the perhaps only way for getting key raw materials and occasion for looting at various levels. Actually, there are multiple solutions to whatever problem. Generally, the easiest or the most immediate is the only one is seen. Solutions are seen or not seen according to mental pattern. The UK were very cleaver in driving Germany to war when it was not yet really ready and against too many, in part avoidable, enemies.

Lootings and slave labour [with racial and racist justifications] were also self-destructive for Nazi German’s ambition because instead of transforming the submitted States and nations in strongholds against the UK and Russia, the German mortal enemies, they became German enemies since the looting, the exterminations and the deportations as starving slaves for the German industry needs. Starving slaves are not real assets. They cannot replace qualified and efficient workers, technicians and professionals. Ethnic groups without any right, looted and stigmatised as inferior do not really cooperate and cannot be really used as reliable allied troops.  Even slaves are precious. Slaves to exploit until their rapid death are as an ephemeral narcotic, with finally more damages than advantages.  

Removed all the obstacles between Russia and Germany, Germany was exposed to the attack of Russian armies and ten millions’ soldiers. Even a reduced but strong and allied Poland would have been more useful than occupying it. When Stalin was moving ten millions’ soldiers for invading Europe, Hitler was obliged to hurriedly prevent the Russian invasion (of about one week-seven days) by an autumn attack without clothes and lubricants for the winter. Also the logistics and the carburant were insufficient for managing an extended front and for reaching and defending the Caucasian oil fields. Germany was not ready although, under attack, was obliged to prevent it. At that point, it was only possible to delay the defeat, for Germany.   

In the book, there is anyway the usual tale that Germany attacked Russia because it wanted to defeat bolshevism. Stalin was manoeuvred from the British who offered him great part of Europe while made Hitler informed that the Russian were in the imminence of an attack. The “mystery” of the millions Russian soldiers suddenly disbanded was simply that they were in movement toward the front so not in reconstituted unit ready to combat. Despite the usual Russian disorganisation, Soviet Russia was living under a permanent war economy, so with abundance of weapons, tanks, artillery, aeroplanes, soldier as its later victories will show. They would be ready in a few days but Germans were more rapidly in hurriedly moving division from the West front to the East one in sudden danger. In Soviet Russia there was disorganisation, inefficiency, the soldiers and pilots were not well trained. However, it was equally a very powerful war machine and with infinite reserves on manpower. And, overall, Russia had raw materials and carburant, although it was proportionally less mechanized and less modernised than Germany.    

The same looting of West Europe did not transform English allies in German allies and also from that side Germany remained opened to a British and American invasion it could not defeat because its aeroplanes and its tanks had not oil for moving against the invaders. In addition, also the populations of the Western European areas had no intention to fight from the Germans side since their starving since the German occupation.   

In addition, the German generals were too conservative and prudent while Hitler was sometime too imprudent as in the Stalingrad case. He preferred never retreat, what sometimes provoked colossal defeats with colossal losses. Other time was too attentive to the economic aspect of the war what, in the case of Moscow, permitted to the Russians to reorganise themselves and to keep it while, probably, the fall of Moscow would have demoralising effect of the Russians. Anyway, since the contempt of the Slavs, and the looting and slave labour policies, German would have transformed equally, even whatever anti-Soviet Russian, in a partisan of Soviet Russia, even the Germans had occupied the whole European Russia and the Caucasian area. Finally, not having conquered Moscow did not really shorten the war, did not really accelerated the German’s defeat.   

Hitler and the whole Germany had not a solid Imperial vision, but only the dream to transform everybody else in slaves, to loot and to rob, and, eventually, to colonise with German settlers some areas of the East. Actually, Germanic populations were and are not so numerous. In fact, the Nazi-Germanic vision was to exterminate the other races. It was not an Imperial vision. It was a shopkeeper “vision” and policy. Hitler, as well as Germanic nationalism, had great vision in his mind but without any solid imperial vision. Also the British have contempt of everybody else, however in a more dissimulated way. But, overall, the British had and have a vision of Empire light and flexible, with a powerful British Navy and Air Force, and with Trade Companies. When the previous British Empire in some way collapsed, it was actually replaced from something else and in underground although irreducible fight of the new world empire of the USA. Also the USA have a vision of Empire with economic, financial and military subordination, and with hundreds and hundreds of military bases spread around the world. A vast territory, a numerous population and mass production are the background of the US Empire. In this way it could, at least partially or in part only apparently, replace the British Empire or to become concurrent of the British Empire and quantitatively certainly more powerful. The only German possibility to dominate Europe and part of the world and to compete with the British and US Empire would have been through and alliance with Russia, or even incorporating in some way Russia but not as a land of slave workers to be progressively exterminated as the German vision was. Anyway, the British and the Americans [the powerful WWII Russian weapons and armies were possible also thanks to U.S. advanced technology provided to Soviet Russia well before WWII] were successful in pushing the Russians against the Germans.

Although, differently from Mussolini, Hitler got at least a partial Bonapartist role and powers, he was expression not only of the German economic and financial oligarchies but also of the Army, the old and conservative Prussia army, which had a key role in is successes and in the consolidation of his power. That even if the German Army, overall since the Versailles Treaty, was finally numerically very small, about 100’000 soldiers, even if there were various paramilitary corps, which were as occult units of the army. On the contrary, the SA of Roehm, who wanted a second and popular national revolution (Jacobin and Soviet style) against the old German oligarchies and against the same “Prussian” army, reached the dimensions of 4 million militians. Obliged to choose between a civil war against the old Prussian elite and against the German oligarchies (with Roehm who wanted to create a revolutionary army), and the establishment, Hitler finally decided against Roehm. The SA were liquidated as an antagonist and revolutionary force. On 1 July 1934, Roehm was assassinated from the SS after that he refused to commit suicide.

In (Pool 1997), there is, obviously, also the narration on how the British favoured the German rearmament and expansion of Germany against a powerful and domineering France. Just Germany replaced France as continental European power, the UK moved against Germany. The book stops with the Hitler’s death. The same game was later played with Russia. The British gave to it half Europe just for freezing half Europe under the Russian rule and for obliging the other half in the “cold war” against the Russian half. Idem in Asia. On the contrary, Africa is simply devastated from tribal conflicts with foreign sponsors of the British and US area. Latin America was destabilised both from the USA using rightist forces, and from the UK using, indirectly, Cuba, but also NATO countries’ Secret Police Bureaux, for spreading leftist terrorism and so justify rightist terrorism. Actually, Cuba tried only to gain friends (countries with which to trade and to cooperate), after having offered generic sponsorships to the various guerrilla movements. What was really devastating was and is the US and British destabilisation for having compradoro regimes in office and in power.    
“England has not permanent friends, but only permanent interests.”
(Pool 1997, p. 100).

In the pre-WWII phase, the turning point was the German operation on Czechoslovakia:
“Chamberlain was offended that Hitler had broken his word, and the prime minister suffered a serious loss of prestige in Britain. But more significantly, from the British point of view, there had been a change in the European balance of power. By crushing Czechoslovakia, Germany had tipped the scale of power and now was as strong as France and her allies. Britain would not tolerate any further aggressive moves by Germany. Incredibly, Hitler did not seem to realize this.”
(Pool 1997, p. 189).

This was not probably the key point. If, for example, France had been just militarily crashed and immediately later transformed in an ally without looting it, it had perhaps become, with its colonies, profitable for Germany. And also its army would have been usable, in some way, for German expansionism. It was not certainly easy to build a block against the British Empire. Anyway, the looting and slave labour policies did not create allies but only temporary acquiring of materials. What would have happened if the Germans had denounced the Soviet plan of occupying Europe and, just defeated the yet disorganised Soviet forces on the way to be assembled along the border, a Ukrainian State allied with Germany, but not just a puppet regime, would have been created? Ukraine could have assured large quantities of food, workers, spaces for eventual settlers. Modernisation and an allied military could protect trades and also eventually war, if the Russians would have not any more sold their oil. There was also the Rumanian one available for Germany. Why the Russians should not sell their oil, once they had lost the British-created illusion they could occupy nearly the whole Europe? Germans, instead, followed, in Ukraine as everywhere, a para-extermination policy. The Ukrainians joined the German military were looking only for a salary. They may have been useful as butchers for the assassination of Jews and others, not really as reliable soldiers. Then, there was something basically biased in the Germanic way of being incapable of building a real Empire instead of just surviving until some decisive defeat. Not only Hitler lacked of a real strategic vision.        

There were obviously differences. The western State were occupied and also pillaged but without policies of racial annihilation.

“Hitler’s pillage of France was restrained compared to the looting of Poland. With the exception of the brutal treatment of the French in Lorraine, French owners were in most cases given some compensation when private property was seized. However, the French certainly suffered as a result of Hitler’s expropriations. During the Nazi occupation, shortages of fuel, raw materials, food, and labor made life difficult for the French people.”
(Pool 1997, p. 213).

Germany suffered again, as in WWII, the English naval blockade. However, in Soviet Russia, also without war, there was abundance of raw materials the same Soviets could not really exploit for their relatively [to the Soviet Union spaces] reduced population and technological development. The only point was to deactivate the Soviet expansionism but also the German dogma, actually very well rooted in the Germanic spirit, of racial superiority and of destruction of whatever other nationality. Basically, there was a lack of pragmatism. Louses from the east and louses from the west clashed in an immense destruction.

The details why each expansionist action of Germany had economic and financial reasons are carefully explained in (Pool 1997). It would be anyway wrong to assume some absolute causal imperative. Actually, only the Russian war is not really understandable because, if the British repressed the German development by their control of the raw material sources and markets, Germany not only was helped from Russia to overcome the Versailles Treaty military limitations using the Soviet territory [previously, the same Russian Revolution was a German military secret operation, since the help it was given to the Russian revolutionaries]. Nazi Germany was in fruitful trade with Soviet Russia, oil included. Germany was in the imminence of a Soviet attack. It prevented it of a week-10 days. As already told, the key element was the German “skills” of transforming even an anti-Soviet Ukraine in a German enemy since the odd German attitudes. So, Germany could not consolidate its initial victories. It is easy to create puppet armies because there are people needing a living. That is not sufficient for creating reliable allied soldiers. The German defensive attack was successful in delaying the Russia offensive. It was unsuccessful in deactivating it. Was the same Jewry liquidation really profitable? It was profitable for thieves and corrupted people. It was profitable for creating further enemies. The myth of Germanic race was a myth. There is no German race. There is a German language. East European Jews were different from Central European, West European and US ones. The various agglomerations were even different among themselves. They did not destabilize Russia. They were not destabilizing Germany or Austria. It was just a fixation, a psychosis.
The book acutely underlines: 
“Italy was more of a liability than an asset because of her military and economic weaknesses.”
(Pool 1997, p. 189).

While cultivating enemies, Germany wanted such an ally. Italy would have been more useful as a neutral space. Anyway, it was a terrible error, for Germany, to rescue the Italian armies could not even defeat the weakest enemies they aggressed.  

On the contrary, the 11 December 1941 war declaration to the USA was just the formalization of a fact and allowed attacks to US interests, ships included. The USA were already helping the UK while they were safe from German attacks.

Again, the question of the Russian war...

The book does not connect:
“Stalin and Russian generals believed Hitler wouldn’t attack Russia because Germany was so dependent on Russia agriculture products and raw materials, particularly oil.” (Pool 1997, p. 239).
“Germany was able to survive from 1939 to 1941 only by evading the blockade by importing one million tons of oil from neutral Russia.” (Pool 1997, p. 241)
“The Russian were taken by surprise and were completely disorganized” (Pool 1997, p. 243). [Why could have they been completely disorganised if not because there were tens of millions of Soviet soldiers in transportations; the borders areas have been freed from both side from whatever defence as in occasions of attacks; the Germans attacked, the Soviets were in the imminence of attacking]
“German locomotives were not built to withstand such cold temperatures. The pipes on many burst, and water froze in the boilers of others. The German soldiers fighting in summer clothing in subzero weather without enough food faced a grim fate. Lubricating oils hardened in rifles and artillery pieces. Fires had to be built underneath tanks to keep the engines from freezing.”
(Pool 1997, p. 248).

Soviets troops had means for a rapid occupation of Europe. Germany was not ready for a war against Russia. Instead, (Pool 1997) simply repeats the usual big lies on this point.

In the book, there are also reports on the deep divisions and fights within the German leadership. This is anyway typical everywhere and in whatever time.

This helps to remember that war is a game against the masses. At ruling classes’ level, everything is different. Not only US companies contributed to the German war effort:
“”There was a gentlemen’s agreement between heavy industry in Germany and abroad that I.G.’s synthetic gasoline plants would not be bombed.”” (Pool 1997, p. 310). ...Without gasoline, the war should immediately stop from the German side... In fact, finally, the fuel shortage paralysed the German military, and that already in Normandy.

The last chapter, Chapter 15, is about the growing mutiny climate there was in Germany, when the war was clearly rapidly lost:
“Only the first of these, the so-called Generals’ Plot of July 20, 1944, is widely known; however, the other two rebellions against Hitler succeeded. The success of these revolts saved hundreds of thousands of lives and preserved a significant portion of Germany’s assets for the postwar reconstruction”
(Pool 1997, p. 359).

In practice, the scorched earth policy was not really implemented in Germany and on the West side of the front. And Berlin was not really defended: “Many army units were deliberately retreating from Berlin rather than back to defend it as ordered.” (Pool 1997, p. 373). Soldiers preferred to be Western Allies prisoners instead of Russian ones. In addition, it was a way to accelerate the end of a war unequivocally rapidly lost. Certainly, there was another key element. Against the fugitives, then, the Nazi repressive machine could not operate anymore. Until the repressive machine could operate, everybody fought a clearly lost war without openly disobeying and escaping.

Pool, J., Hitler and His Secret Partners. Contributions, Loot and Rewards, 1933-1945, Pocket Books, 1997.

Letter from Lhasa, number 203. (Chang 1998): The Rape of Nanking

Letter from Lhasa, number 203. (Chang 1998): The Rape of Nanking
by Roberto Abraham Scaruffi

Chang, I., The Rape of Nanking. The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, Penguin Books, 1998.
(Chang 1998).
Iris Chang     

This is a work about the December 1937 Nanking massacre from the Japanese troops. The author is a hyper-nationalist Chinese. In fact, she forgets to underline as such massacres were and be absolutely currents in Asia and not only in Asia. The same Chinese troops always savagely massacred other Chinese, just they received the order. Louses fell always covered from “orders”. In that historical period, massacres were realised both from the so-called Nationalist and from the Maoists. An example of Nationalist massacre is the 1927 Shanghai massacre and all the connected campaign against the “Northern warlords” and not only.

The action of the Japanese troops in Nanking was particularly savage. Nanking was then the capital of China. Since such wide-scale massacre could have been ordered only from the Japanese Emperor, it had evidently a symbolic meaning in his and their insane minds. Naturally, it was not an isolated event. What is impressive is only its scale and its brutality.

“On December 13, 1937, Nanking, the capital city of Nationalist China, fell to the Japanese.”
(Chang 1998, p. ix).
Nanking will remain occupied for 8 years. The non-combatant assassinated just Nanking was occupied, so in a few weeks, have been of the order of 300,000. According to certain sources they have been less. According to other sources they have been more. According some Japanese, perhaps only a few Chinese casually died. Anyway, after a few weeks there was not any more human material available for massive assassinations, tortures with assassinations, gang rapes with assassinations, bayonet and decapitation exercises and contests on human targets, kidnapping for daily gang rapes in official Japanese army brothels. Nanking became the site of a kind of death’s orgy. Only the Emperor and the Imperial family, with the enthusiastic assent of the formal government and of the competent generals [even if at least one, it seems or he told everybody, was not at all proud of what had happened in Nanking], could have ordered such an insane and criminal operation.  

Inevitably, later, the situation normalised in an ordinary brutal occupation with some active collaborationists and inevitable use of locals, who, on their side, needed some source of revenue for a living. Japanese were the power, the government, the source of revenues, and also a heavy burden if they oppressed to much the locals.      

(Chang 1998) not only interrogates itself, without any real result in my opinion, on the whys of such barbarianism. Not wrongly, the author constantly emphasises as the German war crimes have been object of a constant criticism and self-criticism, while the Japanese crimes, not qualitative and quantitative inferior to the German ones, have been substantially silenced and even with an open intimidation, in Japan, against whoever even slightly try to talk or report about them.

The Japanese, not differently from everybody else, does not at all like to feel ashamed. However they commit, when covered, very shameful insanities and crimes. Their only concern is that somebody might talk about these insanities and crimes, so making them to feel ashamed. It is a curious form of immorality. Guilty are those remembering or unmasking or revealing Japanese insanities and crimes, not the Japanese having committed them. Also the Chinese are identical. Also non-Asian population, or their sectors, have the same attitude. However, in Japan is, in practice, as an official and compulsory State’s policy.

“(In 1990 a gunman shot Motoshima Hitoshi, mayor of Nagasaki, in the chest for saying that Emperor Hirohito bore some responsibility for World War II.) This pervasive sense of danger has discouraged many serious scholars from visiting Japanese archives to conduct their research on the subject; [...].”
(Chang 1998, p. 12).
When there is such a climate, it is because there is an organised system of Secret Police Bureaux, and their “mafias” and other parallel militias, actively involved in the surveillance that the absolute censorship on the matter be not violated.

“And it is not just the fact that while Germans have made repeated apologies to their Holocaust victims, the Japanese have enshrined their war criminals in Tokyo – an act that one American wartime victim of the Japanese has labelled politically equivalent to “erecting a cathedral for Hitler in the middle of Berlin.””
(Chang 1998, p. 12).

Usual brainwashing for louses, however typical not only of Japan:     
“The molding of young men to serve in the Japanese military began early in life, and in the 1930s the martial influence seeped into every aspect of Japanese boyhood.”
(Chang 1998, p. 29).
The Nanking massacre was not a sudden explosion. Already on the way to Nanking the Japanese army behave according to insane and bloody orders:
“Little was spared on the path to Nanking. Japanese veterans remember raiding tiny farm communities, where they clubbed or bayoneted everyone in sight. But small villages were not the only casualties; entire cities were razed to the ground. Consider the example of Suchow (now called Suzhou), a city on the east bank of Tai Hu Lake. One of the oldest cities in China, it was prized for its delicate silk embroidery, and temples. Its canals and ancient bridges had earned the city its Western nickname as “the Venice of China.” On November 19, on a morning of pouring rain, a Japanese advance guard marched through the gates of Suchow, wearing hoods [[...if it was raining!!! MY COMMENT]] that prevented Chinese sentries from recognizing them. Once inside, the Japanese murdered and plundered the city for days, burning down ancient landmarks and abducting thousand of Chinese women for sexual slavery. The invasion, according to the China Weekly Review, caused the population of the city to drop from 350,000 to less than 500.”
(Chang 1998, p. 37-38).
The Emperor and the Imperial family are directly involved in the Nanking massacre:
“On December 7, as the Japanese troops zeroed in on Nanking, General Matsui grew feverishly ill in his field headquarters at Suchow – another flare-up of his chronic tuberculosis. The illness struck Matsui right when power shifted from his command to that of a member of the imperial family. Only five day earlier Emperor Hirohito had promoted Matsui out of the action while dispatching his own uncle, Prince Asaka Yasuhito, to the front to replace him. Under the new order, Matsu would be in charge of the entire central China theatre, while Asaka, a lieutenant general with a thirty-year tenure in the military, would take responsibility as the new commander-in-chief of the army around Nanking. As a member of the royal family, Asaka possessed power that would override all other authority on the Nanking front. He was also closer to Lieutenant General Nakajima and General Yanagawa than to Matsui because he had spent three years in Paris with them as a military intelligence officer.”
(Chang 1998, p. 38-39).
“Wary of the Imperial newcomer and the potential for abuse of power, Matsui issued a set of moral commandments for the invasion of Nanking. He ordered his armies to regroup a few kilometres outside the city walls, to enter the Chinese capital with only a few well-disciplined battalions, and to complete the occupation so that the army would “sparkle before the eyes of the Chinese and make them place confidence in Japan.””
(Chang 1998, p. 39).
The Imperial orders were exactly the opposite. Emperor Hirohito wanted to terrorise and humiliate the Chinese. 

Just Prince Asaka had news that the Chinese troops were ready to surrender, he ordered to kill all captives. The rationality of the order was that the Japanese did not want to feed such a great number of prisoners and did not trust them if simply disarmed and freed. The killings were not simply killings. They were done in a barbaric way and as exercises of brutality for the troops yet inexperienced relatively to sadistic behaviours.

Actually, the same was done with civilians, in addition to generalised tortures and generalised rapes. Looting and burning were the obvious complement.

The Japanese journalists were shocked.

“One of the most bizarre consequences of the wholesale rape that took place in Nanking was the response of the Japanese government to the massive outcry from Western nations. [...]
“The plan was straightforward. By luring, purchasing, or kidnapping between eighty thousand and two hundred thousand women – most of them from the Japanese colony of Korea but many from China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia – the Japanese military hoped to reduce random rape of local women (thereby diminishing the opportunity for international criticism), to contain sexually transmitted diseases through the use of condoms, and to reward soldiers for fighting on the battlefront for long stretches of time. Later, of course, when the world learned of this plan, the Japanese government refused to acknowledge responsibility, insisting for decades afterwards that private entrepreneurs, not the imperial government, ran the wartime military brothels. But in 1991 Yoshimi Yoshiaki unearthed from the Japanese Defence Agency’s archives a document entitled “Regarding the Recruitment of Women for Military Brothels.” The document bore the personal stamp of leaders from the Japanese high command and contained orders to immediate construct “facilities of sexual comfort” to stop troops from raping women in regions they controlled in China.”
(Chang 1998, p. 52-53).

Actually, for what previously told in the same (Chang 1998), see the Suchow/Suzhou case, mass kidnappings for this purpose were already current policy of the Japanese troops.  
From a political and military point of view the Chinese defence of Nanking was a typical case of typical Chinese inaptitude. Chiang Kai-shek decided to defend it, while moving the capital far from Nanking. While deciding to defend it, he decided not really to defend it.

Nanking was militarised and fortified, although in an odd way. So, the city prepared for invasion, with everybody could leave it leaving it. The city was left without air force, although apparently ready for a position war. Also some precious communication equipment had been removed. The soldiers were a mix of retreated from Shanghai and just kidnapped boys from the countryside. The leadership was disorganised and without initiative.

However, there were 90,000 Chinese troops in the Nanking area and with ammunitions for at least 5 months of siege.

Suddenly, on 11 December, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the immediate retreat. The Chinese troops disbanded. Six weeks of horror began.

Some foreigners, a very useful Nazi (of its para-labour and also not racist wing, it seems [perhaps it was the only German not having ever heard about German and Nazi anti-Semitism?!?!?!]) included (John Rabe, a Siemens representative in Nanking), created a self-declared “Nanking Safety Zone”. There was also another Safety Zone, a rural one, outside Nanking. Despite the Japanese troops did not care too much about it, and equally entered it, it was of sure utility for saving and protecting lives. It worked as a kind of psychological intimidation, since Japanese did not dare to shot Westerners, overall the one with swastika. People was equally taken, executed, raped, kidnapped, put in slavery etc from the Safety Zone. However, others could be protected and saved. Naturally, the Safety Zone provided also food, for what it could, and medical assistance, for what it could.    

As current everywhere, also in nowadays, a Japanese technique of domination were narcotics. 

“After the fall of the city, people could freely stroll into opium dens without interference from the police. These dens boldly advertised the drug with Chinese character shingles marked Kuang To, or “official Earth” – a term used for opium.
“To encourage addiction and further enslave the people, the Japanese routinely used narcotics as payment for labor and prostitution in Nanking. Heroin cigarettes were offered to children as young as ten. Based on his research, the University of Nanking history professor Miner Searle Bates concluded that some fifty thousand people in the Nanking area were using heroin – one-eighth of the population at the time.”
(Chang 1998, p. 163).
In April 1939, the Japanese opened a facility in Nanking, Unit Ei 1644, where they did Mengele-style researches and experiments. “The Japanese scientists killed about ten or more people weekly in this manner and disposed of them in the Ei 1644 incinerator.” (Chang 1998, p. 164).
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), begun in Tokyo on 3 May 1946, was just a big show. It prosecuted only 28 Japanese military and political officials and not of the Imperial family. (Chang 1998, p. 172).
That, even if “Only one in twenty-five American POWs died under Nazi captivity, in contrast to one in three under the Japanese.” (Chang 1998, p. 173).
Only 7 Japanese were sentenced and hanged for, or also for, the Nanking massacre. One of them was General Matsui, very probably innocent, so hanged only since his law of silence about the real responsibilities. 

On the other side, the same USA-UK wanted to protect the Imperial family:
“Hirohito lived long after Japan’s surrender but never faced a full moral accounting for his activities during the war. In exchange for Japan’s surrender, the American government granted him, the emperor of Japan, immunity from trial, so he was not called in as a defendant or even a witness. Because the terms of the surrender exonerated all members of the Japanese imperial family, Hirohito’s uncle Prince Asaka (under whose command the “Kill All Captives” order was forged) also escaped justice, exempting him from having to appear at the IMTFE at all.”
(Chang 1998, p. 176).

Also useful war archives were given back to Japan without microfilming them.

If in Europe there was the justification of the cold war, in Asia there was the justification of the Korean war, later of the Vietnamese one etc, and of the Chinese peril (actually, Mao secretly was a British and a US client). The recent past might and must be rapidly forgotten. On the other side, also the British and the Americans were not particularly innocent and pure.

Chang, I., The Rape of Nanking. The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II, Penguin Books, 1998.