Lettera da Lhasa numero 44. China's National Defense in 2006
by Roberto Scaruffi
China's National Defense in 2006, issued by the Information Office of the State Council People's Republic of China, 29 December 2006,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm
Lasciamo stare l’aria fritta sulla politica militare puramente difensiva, sul mondo che si stia muovendo verso il multipolarismo, sull’importanza della ricerca & sviluppo e dell’alta tecnologia negli armamenti, e sull’affermazione che a livello mondiale si stia sviluppando una intensa competizione militare basata sull’informatizzazione.
Quale sia la differenza tra difesa ed attacco fa parte della sofistica. Tutte le politiche militari sono necessariamente difensive ed offensive.
Potenze emergenti che scalzino le presenti conducono al multipolarismo o ad un accentuato multipolarismo, come possono portare ad un nuovo monopolarismo se una potenza si impone su tutte. La pseudo-civilizzazione cinese, come le pratiche cinesi contemporanee, è del tutto difensiva, essendo il cinese timoroso del mondo esterno, non un conquistatore. Infatti, la Cina manca d’una vera tradizione militare di conquista e dominazione, se non a protezione del proprio spazio non certo piccolo ma limitato. La Cina non ha mai avuto una visione ed una pratica si dominazione globale, contrariamente a civilizzazioni europee pur centrate su Stati di piccole dimensioni relativamente, per esempio, al mastodontico spazio cinese. In Mao, the Unknown Story, Jung Chang e Jon Halliday attribuiscono a Mao una tale visione, sebbene essa non sembra avere avuto un fondamento materiale, né essersi materializzata in politiche conseguenti, sempre che Mao avesse davvero avuto tali intenzioni e non solo qualche l’atomica ed i missili a consolazione del pauperismo da campo di concentramento da lui imposto, e tramite di lui imposto dai padroni del mondo, alla Cina. Certo, tutto può cambiare, forse, talvolta.
Che le forze armate della RPC siano inevitabilmente avviate alla tecnologizzazione, considerato il livello di partenza infimo e dipendente del militarismo cinese, risponde a banali necessità di protezione, proprio quando la Cina si sente confrontata ad un mondo in tutto superiore e dominatore.
L’estensore o gli estensori del testo qui presentato sono chiaramente sotto la suggestione del concetto di informatizzazione, concetto che non è significhi granché in questo contesto. Probabilmente, hanno sbirciato gli stati maggiori americani e le loro sale operative, dal vero o nei film. http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/china/iw/chinaiw.htm Alla fine, la capacità di usare armamenti si basa sull’averli. Per quanto tecnologizzata, una guerra non si combatte e si vince con armamenti immaginari. La guerra non è puro scontro di intelligenze. E pure a questo livello, le caratteristiche cinesi di timore dell’iniziativa individuale e di canali informativi ostruiti, soprattutto dal basso verso l’alto, mal si conciliano con guerre combattute tra intelligenze. La fede nell’informatizzazione maschera il desiderio di sopprimere l’individuo tramite procedure predefinite e pre-approvate dal Potere. Cosa che non si concilia con la versatilità necessaria per fronteggiare situazioni impreviste. L’eccessiva pre-routinizzazione delle linee operative e tecnologizzazione del comando sta danneggiando le stesse forze armate americane che, nonostante la superiorità d’armamenti, sembrano incapaci di usarli in modo efficiente, per vincere davvero battaglie e guerre. Tali metodologie non possono che essere ancor più devastanti in ambito cinese, in un contesto di cultura del servaggio.
Il testo mostra attenzione agli sviluppi nell’area Pacifico-Asiatica, cioè dove immediatamente gravita o sceglie di gravitare la RPC, area in cui è ormai decollata la Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) come forma di relazioni tra gli Stati dell’area.
La Cina è attenta agli sviluppi del Giappone alla ricerca di una sua politica militare attiva in cooperazione operativa con gli USA, lasciandosi alle spalle i vincoli della sconfitta bellica di più di 60 anni fa. Si rileva, pur senza grandi enfatizzazioni, che “Its military posture is becoming more external-oriented.” Come dire che gli orientamenti militari del Giappone non sono strettamente difensivi.
Considerando Taiwan cinese, la RPC include nella sua politica militare il recupero di Taiwan alla RPC. Inanzitutto deve combattere il separatismo di Taiwan, stato già indipendente che vorrebbe formalizzare questa sua realtà, con gli USA che pur opponendo questa prospettiva tuttavia sembrano continuare a sostere l’indipendenza di fatto di Taiwan: “The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform," thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The United States has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy and honor the three joint communiqués between China and the United States. But, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan.” Secondo il testo, la politica militare della RPC, pur puramente difensiva, deve mantenere la sicurezza e l’unità della RPC.
L’imperativo è dunque la modernizzazione delle FFAA. C’è evidentemente la suggestione dell’informatizzazione, o del concetto di informatizzazione, anche se la prospettiva di essere in condizione di combattere e vincere “guerre informatizzate” è posizionata nella meta del secolo XXI: “The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.” La dilazione temporale non tradisce una grande fiducia nelle proprie forze.
In cosa consista la politica puramente difensiva è subito chiarito: “Upholding national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national development. This includes guarding against and resisting aggression, defending against violation of China's territorial sea and air space, and borders; opposing and containing the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities, taking precautions against and cracking down on terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms.” Dunque essa contempla una guerra offensiva contro Taiwan. Del resto, le politiche militari puramente difensive non esistono. Per il resto, si indica come missione delle FFAA il consolidamento del regime e del suo partito, combattendo tendenze separatiste che sono presenti in aree importanti della RPC.
Le FFAA cinesi hanno evidentelmente una struttura regionalizzata, feudalizzata, nella tradizione di Stato debole alla cinese, perché si enfatizza la necesssità della loro centralizzazione. Se vuole passare dalle FFAA “scuola di vita”, alias di servaggio, dunque distribuite sul territorio, a vere FFAA per far la guerra, certo che esse devono sia tecnologizzarsi che essere agli stetti ordini delle autorità centrali.
La struttura organizzativa e direzionale della FFAA cinesi resta complessa, riflettendo il democraticismo della società cinese dove tutti decidono e nessuno decide, nessuno fidandosi di nessuno e risolvendosi questa diffidenza reciproca nell’irresponsabilità più totale, salvo poi eventuali canali di direzione di fatto che scavalchino i canali formali. Ciò che è comunque il contrario di meccanismi decisionali e di responsabilità efficienti.
Nel testo, si annuncia la continuazione dei tagli dimensionali delle FFAA che consistono nelle riduzione numerica della fanteria mentre vi sono incrementi nella marina, nell’aviazione e nell’artiglieria, ed in tutti i settori a maggiore tecnologizzazione. Il numero totale di militari viene dichiarato in 2.3 milioni.
Si cerca di disegnare delle FFAA che la RPC non ha mai avuto:
“The Army is speeding up the upgrading and informationization of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building Army aviation, light mechanized and information countermeasures units. The share of the armored component in the Army combined combat forces has been further raised. The artillery and air defense component has fielded new types of cannons, field antiaircraft missiles, reconnaissance early warning radars, fire-control systems, and intelligence and command systems, and increased the proportion of ground-to-air missiles to antiaircraft guns. The engineering component has grown in step with the main combat arms, and improved its capabilities of accompanying support and precision support. The anti-chemical component has established a preliminary nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection system tailored to joint operations, and greatly increased its capabilities of rapid NBC protection, NBC emergency rescue and operations against NBC terrorism. The communications component has enhanced the building of platforms for general-purpose information transmission and processing, C2 systems and spectrum management systems, and raised communications and information support capabilities.
“Founded in 1986, the Army aviation arm has a three-level (general headquarters/departments, theaters of war and first-line task groups) administration system. Equipped mainly with armed helicopters, transport helicopters and service helicopters, it carries out air strike, air landing, airlifting and battlefield service support operations. The Army aviation arm works to strengthen its capabilities of rapid power projection, precision strike, long-range assault and support.
“The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations. The Navy is enhancing research into the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime people's war under modern conditions.
“The Air Force is working to build an informationized air fighting force with both offensive and defensive capabilities. It is reducing the number of combat aircraft, giving priority to the development of new fighters as well as air and missile defense weapons. It is working to enhance command and control systems. It stresses mission-oriented and confrontational training, increasing combined tactical training of different arms and aircraft types, and conducts training in flying refitted new aircraft and using new weaponry and equipment in an active and stable way. Air Force pilot training is conducted at flying colleges, training bases and combat units in five phases, namely, basic education, primary flying, advanced flying, refitted combat aircraft flying and tactical flying. Aviation units mainly conduct training in counter-air operations, air-to-ground attacks and joint operations. Pilots fly training hours are commensurate with the tasks assigned to pilots.
“The Second Artillery Force is striving to build a streamlined and effective strategic force with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. It is quickening its steps to raise the informationization level of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control system, and increase its capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counterstrikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles. It is improving the construction of its battlefield system, and associated logistics and equipment, and raising the cost-effectiveness of integrated support. It is deepening the reform of training, enhancing integrated training, using scientific and technological achievements to raise training quality. It is strengthening the safety management and control mechanism of nuclear missiles, and improving the relevant rules and regulations and technical preventive measures as well as emergency steps for handling nuclear accidents. The Second Artillery Force is equipped with surface-to-surface strategic missiles and tactical operational missiles of various types.”
Vi sono i conseguenti corrispettivi, a livello d’istituti d’istruzione militare, di questo processo di modernizzazione.
Le FFAA delle RPC, come quelle d’altri paesi o Stati, non si limitano alla tradizionale categorizzazione di truppe di terra, mare ed aria (nella RPC c’è come entità separata da queste tre pure un corpo od arma speciale d’artiglieria). V’è dell’altro. Nella RPC v’è un corpo di polizia, distinto dalla polizia classica che pur esiste, e vi sono le milizie.
Vediamo il corpo di polizia, la PAPF, nell’acronimo inglese, creata nel 1982-83.
“The Chinese People’s Armed Police Force
“The Chinese People’s Armed Police Force was established on June 19, 1982. It consists of internal security forces, gold mine, forest, water conservancy, electricity power, and transportation forces. The frontier police force, fire brigades and security guards are also included into the Armed Police Force. The internal security forces are composed of contingents and mobile divisions. The Armed Police Force is constructed in accordance with the PLA’s guiding concept, purpose and principles of army building, as well as its orders, rules and regulations, combined with characteristics of the Armed Police Force. It implements the Military Service Law of the PRC, and enjoys the same benefits as those of the PLA. The basic missions of the Armed Police Force are to maintain state security and social stability, protect facilities and objects significant to the state, safeguard people’s lives and properties, and assist the PLA in wartime in defensive operations.
“The Armed Police Force is subordinate to the State Council, and is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The Armed Police Force receives unified leadership and management, and its command is delegated to a relevant organ at each level. The Armed Police Force has three echelons of leadership, namely, general headquarters, contingent (division) and detachment (regiment). The General Headquarters of the Armed Police Force, as the chief commanding organ of the Armed Police Force, commands and administers internal security forces, and gold mine, forest, water conservancy, electricity power, and transportation forces. In the nationwide administrative hierarchy, the Armed Police contingents, detachments, and squadrons are instituted at province, prefecture, and county levels respectively. When performing a public security task or relevant work, the Armed Police Force unit is subordinate to the leadership and command of the public security organs at the same level.
“In peacetime, the tasks of the Armed Police Force include performing guard duties at fixed points, dealing with contingencies, combating terrorism and supporting national economic development. Guard duties at fixed points chiefly means, among others, security guard, watch and ward, prison and detention guard, escort and patrol. It is specifically responsible for protecting the security of state-designated objects to be guarded, important visiting foreign dignitaries, leading organs of the Party and government at and above the provincial level, embassies and consulates of foreign countries in China, important national and international conferences, and sites of large-scale cultural and sports activities; posting peripheral armed guards at prisons and detention houses; providing armed protection for key departments in charge of confidential work and critical parts of important airports, radio stations, state economic departments, and national defense works, as well as important bridges and tunnels along trunk railway lines, and specially designated large road bridges; and performing armed patrol and other security duties in state-designated large and medium-sized cities or specific zones. Dealing with contingencies chiefly means handling, according to law, sudden illegal incidents endangering state security or social order, such as revolts, riots and disturbances, fights with weapons and other group activities that endanger public security. Combating terrorism chiefly means performing anti-attack, anti-hijacking and anti-explosion tasks. Supporting national economic development chiefly means gold mine prospecting, preventing and fighting forest fire, participation in key state energy and transportation projects, and emergency rescue and disaster relief in cases of serious calamities.”
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/III.htm
“The People's Armed Police Force
“The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), after a trial period in selected jurisdictions, was officially established at the national level in 1983. In line with the general policy of reducing the size of the armed forces and transferring responsibilities to the civilian sector, the newly established force was formed from internal security units reassigned from the PLA to the Ministry of Public Security and from border defense (customs) and fire-fighting units (see Military Modernization, ch. 14). In 1985 the PAPF consisted of approximately 600,000 volunteers and conscripts. With a general headquarters at the national level and subordinate division-level provincial or specialized units, regimental-level detachments, and battalion-level brigades, it retained its military organization.
“PAPF units assigned to internal security were responsible for guarding party and state organizations and foreign embassies and consulates, as well as for responding to emergencies and maintaining law and order. Border defense units performed standard customs duties, such as inspecting vehicles and ships entering and leaving the country, and maintained surveillance against smugglers and drug traffickers. PAPF firefighting units were responsible for fire-prevention education as well as for fighting fires. PAPF units at every level worked in close cooperation with the armed forces and other public security organizations.”
http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/part5
“V. People's Armed Police Force
“The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) is charged with the fundamental task of safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and contentment. It strives to make itself a powerful, disciplined and politically reliable force.
“Structure and Organization
“As a component of China's armed forces and subordinate to the State Council, the PAPF is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The State Council exercises leadership over the PAPF through relevant functional departments, assigns routine tasks to it, decides its size and number of organizations, and is responsible for its command, operations, and financial and material support. The PAPF has an independent budgetary status in the financial expenditure of the state. The CMC is responsible for the PAPF's organizational structure, management of officers, command, training and political work. It exercises leadership over the PAPF through the four general headquarters/departments. In terms of conducting public security operations and relevant capability building, the PAPF General Headquarters is under the leadership and command of the Ministry of Public Security, and the PAPF units at and below the contingent level are under the leadership and command of the public security organs at the same level. The PAPF has a total force of 660,000.
“The PAPF consists mainly of the internal security force and forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications. The border security, firefighting and security guard forces are also components of the PAPF. The PAPF General Headquarters is the leading and commanding organ that directs and administers the internal security force and forces guarding gold mine, forest, water and electricity, and communications, etc., and provides guidance to other forces subordinate to the PAPF. Under it are the headquarters, political department and logistics department. The PAPF has one commander-in-chief, one first political commissar (assumed concurrently by the Minister of Public Security), one political commissar, and several deputy commanders-in-chief and deputy political commissars. The PAPF internal security force is composed of contingents at the level of the province (autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government) and armed police divisions. Contingents, detachments and squadrons are instituted at the province, prefecture, and county levels, respectively. The armed police divisions have regiments, battalions and companies in battle order, which are stationed in a number of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government. The forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have their own headquarters, which function as their leading and commanding organs. The PAPF General Headquarters has an educational institution directly under it. The contingent headquarters and the headquarters of the forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have elementary command colleges under them.
“Basic Tasks
“In peacetime, the PAPF is tasked to perform guard duties, handle emergencies, combat terrorism, and participate in and support national economic development. In wartime, it assists the PLA in defensive operations.
“Every day, more than 260,000 PAPF servicemen are on guard duty. Through the combined use of manpower, facilities and technologies, the PAPF has effectively enhanced the efficiency of guard duties and security in recent years. The PAPF annually handles an average of over 100 cases of attempted attacks against guarded targets and escape attempts by detained suspects and imprisoned criminals, organizes thousands of important temporary duties, and ensures the security of important international and national conferences and large-scale events, in cooperation with the government departments concerned. Adhering to the guidelines and principles for handling emergencies, and using proper methods and tactics, the PAPF effectively safeguards the fundamental interests of the people, social stability and the dignity of the law. The PAPF anti-terrorism units closely follow the state's anti-terrorism guidelines and principles, and enhance their combat-readiness training. They have been involved in the successful handling of cases of bombing attempts and kidnapping incidents. The various units of the PAPF take an active part in efforts to keep local order, and assist the public security departments in catching and arresting criminal suspects and cracking down on organized criminal gangs.
“The PAPF gold mine force has completed 38 geological prospecting projects in a dozen provinces and autonomous regions, and found some rich gold deposits. In the last two years, the PAPF forest force has put out 552 forest or prairie fires, protecting valuable natural resources. The PAPF water and electricity force has taken part in the construction of 21 key national projects, including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the West-East Natural Gas Transmission Project, the South-North Water Diversion Project, and major hydropower projects. The PAPF communications force is responsible for the maintenance of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway and the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, and has undertaken the construction of national high-grade highways, extra-long tunnels and bridges. Those projects built by the PAPF communications force are all up to standards. In the past two years, 224,000 PAPF troops have participated in 2,320 emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, and rescued and evacuated 250,000 people in disaster-stricken areas.
“Force Building
“The PAPF is working to strengthen itself through science and technology. It is enhancing staff competence, and conducting strict management so that its personnel can fully perform their duties. Using the national information infrastructure, the PAPF has established a preliminary system of three-level integrated information networks, linking general headquarters with the grass-roots squadrons. It has made progress in real-time command and control, management of duties through visual means, networked education and training, and office automation. The PAPF possesses a basically complete range of equipment through R&D and procurement of urgently needed weaponry and equipment. It has set up and improved a distinctive mechanism for the selection, training and employment of officers and NCOs. In particular, priority is given to the training of inter-disciplinary personnel. The PAPF conducts mission-oriented training on a priority basis to better perform guard duties, manage emergencies and combat terrorism. It participated in China's "Great Wall-2003" and "Great Wall II" anti-terrorism exercises, and the SCO's "Joint-2003" exercise, and sponsored the "Guard-04" and "Guard-06" exercises to deal with large-scale emergencies. The PAPF runs its forces strictly and pursuant to the law. It stresses that leaders make decisions, administrative organs conduct management, and officers and men perform their duties strictly in accordance with the law. As a result, its overall performance has been greatly boosted.
“The PAPF is steadily improving its logistical support system based on self-support and supplemented by social and PLA support to raise the efficiency of integrated support. It runs a crisis response support system covering the three echelons of the general headquarters, contingents (divisions) and detachments (regiments), to better respond to emergencies, and unexpected and complex situations. It promotes standardized and institutional logistical management by exploitation of IT and uniformly standardizes its facility configurations, work procedures, operating mechanisms and management requirements. The PAPF is pursuing reforms in housing, procurement of bulk materials and project procurement, medical care, and outsources food, barracks and bedding and clothing services.
“In recent years, the PAPF has conducted friendly exchanges with the armed police forces, military police, internal security forces, public security forces and other similar forces of more than 30 countries to draw on each other's practices and cooperate in conducting anti-terrorism training. Its medical personnel, as part of Chinese rescue teams, have participated in disaster-relief missions in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean.”
Vediamo ora la milizia.
La milizia, con funzioni sia militari che di polizia, consiste di un 10 milioni di miliziani, mobilitabili in qualunque momento per compiti sia di supporto militare che di polizia. Essa, come già la PAPF e le stesse FFAA nel loro complesso, dipende sia dal Governo (State Council) che dalla Commissione Militare Centrale (CMC).
“The Militia
“The militia is an armed mass organization not released from production. It is a reserve force of the PLA and the basis for the prosecution of a people’s war under modern conditions. The General Staff Headquarters administers the building of the militia under the leadership of the State Council and the CMC. Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations, and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in emergency rescue and disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.
“In accordance with provisions in the Military Service Law of the PRC, male citizens from 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for military service, excluding those enlisted for active service, shall be regimented into militia units to perform reserve service. The militia has two categories: the primary and the ordinary. A selected group of militiamen under the age of 28, including soldiers discharged from active service and other persons who have received or are selected for military training, shall be regimented into the primary militia; other male citizens belonging to the age group of 18 to 35, who are qualified for reserve service shall be regimented into the ordinary militia. The primary militia may recruit female citizens when necessary. Rural towns and townships, administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions of a certain scale are the basic units in which the militia is organized. Primary militiamen are separately organized for concentrated military training in militia military training bases of administrative areas at the county level. Currently, there are emergency detachments, and such specialized technical detachments as anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machineguns, portable air defense missiles, ground artillery, communications, chemical defense, engineering and reconnaissance detachments.
“To ensure that militiamen are always ready to respond to the call in case of a contingency, the Chinese government has formulated a militia combat readiness system, whereby combat readiness education is carried out regularly among the militia with the purpose of enhancing their national defense awareness, and exercises are conducted in accordance with combat readiness plans to enhance the militia’s operational capabilities.”
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/III.htm
“Militia Force Building
“China's militia is under the unified direction of the State Council and the CMC, and the dual leadership of local Party committees and governments as well as the military commands. The concept of people's war, and the principle of combining regular work with military training and combining peacetime needs with wartime needs are observed in the building of the militia.
“The focus of the militia work is being shifted from rural areas to cities and areas along communication lines. The setting up of militia forces has expanded from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises and from traditional industries to high-tech industries. Specialized technical units rather than infantry are becoming the backbone of the militia. The proportion of antiaircraft artillery, ground artillery, missile, communications, engineering, anti-chemical, reconnaissance, information and other specialized technical units in the overall militia force is being raised. The building of militia units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force is being strengthened. A new organizational structure of the militia has taken shape, with specialized technical units and units with corresponding specialties serving as the main body, and air defense units, units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and emergency response units playing a leading role.
“The state has increased investment in militia weaponry and equipment, with priority given to equipment for air defense, emergency response and maintenance of stability. The state has phased out a number of out-dated weapons. Militia training reform has been deepened; a four-level system for organizing training is practiced, the four levels being provincial military commands, prefectural military commands, people's armed forces departments of counties (county-level cities or municipal districts) and basic-level people's armed forces departments. Through interlinked training as well as joint training and exercises with active PLA units, the militia has boosted its capabilities of conducting rapid mobilization and carrying out its specialized tasks.”
Quando saranno confrontate a crisi reali ed a combattimenti reali con FFAA moderne, si vedrà se la trasformazione delle FFAA della RPC in FFAA moderne si sarà davvero realizzata. Viste le crescenti tensioni dell’area, non è detto si debba aspettare molto, dopo le olimpiadi del 2008.
China's National Defense in 2006, issued by the Information Office of the State Council People's Republic of China, 29 December 2006,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm
by Roberto Scaruffi
China's National Defense in 2006, issued by the Information Office of the State Council People's Republic of China, 29 December 2006,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm
Lasciamo stare l’aria fritta sulla politica militare puramente difensiva, sul mondo che si stia muovendo verso il multipolarismo, sull’importanza della ricerca & sviluppo e dell’alta tecnologia negli armamenti, e sull’affermazione che a livello mondiale si stia sviluppando una intensa competizione militare basata sull’informatizzazione.
Quale sia la differenza tra difesa ed attacco fa parte della sofistica. Tutte le politiche militari sono necessariamente difensive ed offensive.
Potenze emergenti che scalzino le presenti conducono al multipolarismo o ad un accentuato multipolarismo, come possono portare ad un nuovo monopolarismo se una potenza si impone su tutte. La pseudo-civilizzazione cinese, come le pratiche cinesi contemporanee, è del tutto difensiva, essendo il cinese timoroso del mondo esterno, non un conquistatore. Infatti, la Cina manca d’una vera tradizione militare di conquista e dominazione, se non a protezione del proprio spazio non certo piccolo ma limitato. La Cina non ha mai avuto una visione ed una pratica si dominazione globale, contrariamente a civilizzazioni europee pur centrate su Stati di piccole dimensioni relativamente, per esempio, al mastodontico spazio cinese. In Mao, the Unknown Story, Jung Chang e Jon Halliday attribuiscono a Mao una tale visione, sebbene essa non sembra avere avuto un fondamento materiale, né essersi materializzata in politiche conseguenti, sempre che Mao avesse davvero avuto tali intenzioni e non solo qualche l’atomica ed i missili a consolazione del pauperismo da campo di concentramento da lui imposto, e tramite di lui imposto dai padroni del mondo, alla Cina. Certo, tutto può cambiare, forse, talvolta.
Che le forze armate della RPC siano inevitabilmente avviate alla tecnologizzazione, considerato il livello di partenza infimo e dipendente del militarismo cinese, risponde a banali necessità di protezione, proprio quando la Cina si sente confrontata ad un mondo in tutto superiore e dominatore.
L’estensore o gli estensori del testo qui presentato sono chiaramente sotto la suggestione del concetto di informatizzazione, concetto che non è significhi granché in questo contesto. Probabilmente, hanno sbirciato gli stati maggiori americani e le loro sale operative, dal vero o nei film. http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/china/iw/chinaiw.htm Alla fine, la capacità di usare armamenti si basa sull’averli. Per quanto tecnologizzata, una guerra non si combatte e si vince con armamenti immaginari. La guerra non è puro scontro di intelligenze. E pure a questo livello, le caratteristiche cinesi di timore dell’iniziativa individuale e di canali informativi ostruiti, soprattutto dal basso verso l’alto, mal si conciliano con guerre combattute tra intelligenze. La fede nell’informatizzazione maschera il desiderio di sopprimere l’individuo tramite procedure predefinite e pre-approvate dal Potere. Cosa che non si concilia con la versatilità necessaria per fronteggiare situazioni impreviste. L’eccessiva pre-routinizzazione delle linee operative e tecnologizzazione del comando sta danneggiando le stesse forze armate americane che, nonostante la superiorità d’armamenti, sembrano incapaci di usarli in modo efficiente, per vincere davvero battaglie e guerre. Tali metodologie non possono che essere ancor più devastanti in ambito cinese, in un contesto di cultura del servaggio.
Il testo mostra attenzione agli sviluppi nell’area Pacifico-Asiatica, cioè dove immediatamente gravita o sceglie di gravitare la RPC, area in cui è ormai decollata la Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) come forma di relazioni tra gli Stati dell’area.
La Cina è attenta agli sviluppi del Giappone alla ricerca di una sua politica militare attiva in cooperazione operativa con gli USA, lasciandosi alle spalle i vincoli della sconfitta bellica di più di 60 anni fa. Si rileva, pur senza grandi enfatizzazioni, che “Its military posture is becoming more external-oriented.” Come dire che gli orientamenti militari del Giappone non sono strettamente difensivi.
Considerando Taiwan cinese, la RPC include nella sua politica militare il recupero di Taiwan alla RPC. Inanzitutto deve combattere il separatismo di Taiwan, stato già indipendente che vorrebbe formalizzare questa sua realtà, con gli USA che pur opponendo questa prospettiva tuttavia sembrano continuare a sostere l’indipendenza di fatto di Taiwan: “The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform," thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The United States has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy and honor the three joint communiqués between China and the United States. But, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan.” Secondo il testo, la politica militare della RPC, pur puramente difensiva, deve mantenere la sicurezza e l’unità della RPC.
L’imperativo è dunque la modernizzazione delle FFAA. C’è evidentemente la suggestione dell’informatizzazione, o del concetto di informatizzazione, anche se la prospettiva di essere in condizione di combattere e vincere “guerre informatizzate” è posizionata nella meta del secolo XXI: “The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.” La dilazione temporale non tradisce una grande fiducia nelle proprie forze.
In cosa consista la politica puramente difensiva è subito chiarito: “Upholding national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national development. This includes guarding against and resisting aggression, defending against violation of China's territorial sea and air space, and borders; opposing and containing the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities, taking precautions against and cracking down on terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms.” Dunque essa contempla una guerra offensiva contro Taiwan. Del resto, le politiche militari puramente difensive non esistono. Per il resto, si indica come missione delle FFAA il consolidamento del regime e del suo partito, combattendo tendenze separatiste che sono presenti in aree importanti della RPC.
Le FFAA cinesi hanno evidentelmente una struttura regionalizzata, feudalizzata, nella tradizione di Stato debole alla cinese, perché si enfatizza la necesssità della loro centralizzazione. Se vuole passare dalle FFAA “scuola di vita”, alias di servaggio, dunque distribuite sul territorio, a vere FFAA per far la guerra, certo che esse devono sia tecnologizzarsi che essere agli stetti ordini delle autorità centrali.
La struttura organizzativa e direzionale della FFAA cinesi resta complessa, riflettendo il democraticismo della società cinese dove tutti decidono e nessuno decide, nessuno fidandosi di nessuno e risolvendosi questa diffidenza reciproca nell’irresponsabilità più totale, salvo poi eventuali canali di direzione di fatto che scavalchino i canali formali. Ciò che è comunque il contrario di meccanismi decisionali e di responsabilità efficienti.
Nel testo, si annuncia la continuazione dei tagli dimensionali delle FFAA che consistono nelle riduzione numerica della fanteria mentre vi sono incrementi nella marina, nell’aviazione e nell’artiglieria, ed in tutti i settori a maggiore tecnologizzazione. Il numero totale di militari viene dichiarato in 2.3 milioni.
Si cerca di disegnare delle FFAA che la RPC non ha mai avuto:
“The Army is speeding up the upgrading and informationization of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building Army aviation, light mechanized and information countermeasures units. The share of the armored component in the Army combined combat forces has been further raised. The artillery and air defense component has fielded new types of cannons, field antiaircraft missiles, reconnaissance early warning radars, fire-control systems, and intelligence and command systems, and increased the proportion of ground-to-air missiles to antiaircraft guns. The engineering component has grown in step with the main combat arms, and improved its capabilities of accompanying support and precision support. The anti-chemical component has established a preliminary nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection system tailored to joint operations, and greatly increased its capabilities of rapid NBC protection, NBC emergency rescue and operations against NBC terrorism. The communications component has enhanced the building of platforms for general-purpose information transmission and processing, C2 systems and spectrum management systems, and raised communications and information support capabilities.
“Founded in 1986, the Army aviation arm has a three-level (general headquarters/departments, theaters of war and first-line task groups) administration system. Equipped mainly with armed helicopters, transport helicopters and service helicopters, it carries out air strike, air landing, airlifting and battlefield service support operations. The Army aviation arm works to strengthen its capabilities of rapid power projection, precision strike, long-range assault and support.
“The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations. The Navy is enhancing research into the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime people's war under modern conditions.
“The Air Force is working to build an informationized air fighting force with both offensive and defensive capabilities. It is reducing the number of combat aircraft, giving priority to the development of new fighters as well as air and missile defense weapons. It is working to enhance command and control systems. It stresses mission-oriented and confrontational training, increasing combined tactical training of different arms and aircraft types, and conducts training in flying refitted new aircraft and using new weaponry and equipment in an active and stable way. Air Force pilot training is conducted at flying colleges, training bases and combat units in five phases, namely, basic education, primary flying, advanced flying, refitted combat aircraft flying and tactical flying. Aviation units mainly conduct training in counter-air operations, air-to-ground attacks and joint operations. Pilots fly training hours are commensurate with the tasks assigned to pilots.
“The Second Artillery Force is striving to build a streamlined and effective strategic force with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. It is quickening its steps to raise the informationization level of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control system, and increase its capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counterstrikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles. It is improving the construction of its battlefield system, and associated logistics and equipment, and raising the cost-effectiveness of integrated support. It is deepening the reform of training, enhancing integrated training, using scientific and technological achievements to raise training quality. It is strengthening the safety management and control mechanism of nuclear missiles, and improving the relevant rules and regulations and technical preventive measures as well as emergency steps for handling nuclear accidents. The Second Artillery Force is equipped with surface-to-surface strategic missiles and tactical operational missiles of various types.”
Vi sono i conseguenti corrispettivi, a livello d’istituti d’istruzione militare, di questo processo di modernizzazione.
Le FFAA delle RPC, come quelle d’altri paesi o Stati, non si limitano alla tradizionale categorizzazione di truppe di terra, mare ed aria (nella RPC c’è come entità separata da queste tre pure un corpo od arma speciale d’artiglieria). V’è dell’altro. Nella RPC v’è un corpo di polizia, distinto dalla polizia classica che pur esiste, e vi sono le milizie.
Vediamo il corpo di polizia, la PAPF, nell’acronimo inglese, creata nel 1982-83.
“The Chinese People’s Armed Police Force
“The Chinese People’s Armed Police Force was established on June 19, 1982. It consists of internal security forces, gold mine, forest, water conservancy, electricity power, and transportation forces. The frontier police force, fire brigades and security guards are also included into the Armed Police Force. The internal security forces are composed of contingents and mobile divisions. The Armed Police Force is constructed in accordance with the PLA’s guiding concept, purpose and principles of army building, as well as its orders, rules and regulations, combined with characteristics of the Armed Police Force. It implements the Military Service Law of the PRC, and enjoys the same benefits as those of the PLA. The basic missions of the Armed Police Force are to maintain state security and social stability, protect facilities and objects significant to the state, safeguard people’s lives and properties, and assist the PLA in wartime in defensive operations.
“The Armed Police Force is subordinate to the State Council, and is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The Armed Police Force receives unified leadership and management, and its command is delegated to a relevant organ at each level. The Armed Police Force has three echelons of leadership, namely, general headquarters, contingent (division) and detachment (regiment). The General Headquarters of the Armed Police Force, as the chief commanding organ of the Armed Police Force, commands and administers internal security forces, and gold mine, forest, water conservancy, electricity power, and transportation forces. In the nationwide administrative hierarchy, the Armed Police contingents, detachments, and squadrons are instituted at province, prefecture, and county levels respectively. When performing a public security task or relevant work, the Armed Police Force unit is subordinate to the leadership and command of the public security organs at the same level.
“In peacetime, the tasks of the Armed Police Force include performing guard duties at fixed points, dealing with contingencies, combating terrorism and supporting national economic development. Guard duties at fixed points chiefly means, among others, security guard, watch and ward, prison and detention guard, escort and patrol. It is specifically responsible for protecting the security of state-designated objects to be guarded, important visiting foreign dignitaries, leading organs of the Party and government at and above the provincial level, embassies and consulates of foreign countries in China, important national and international conferences, and sites of large-scale cultural and sports activities; posting peripheral armed guards at prisons and detention houses; providing armed protection for key departments in charge of confidential work and critical parts of important airports, radio stations, state economic departments, and national defense works, as well as important bridges and tunnels along trunk railway lines, and specially designated large road bridges; and performing armed patrol and other security duties in state-designated large and medium-sized cities or specific zones. Dealing with contingencies chiefly means handling, according to law, sudden illegal incidents endangering state security or social order, such as revolts, riots and disturbances, fights with weapons and other group activities that endanger public security. Combating terrorism chiefly means performing anti-attack, anti-hijacking and anti-explosion tasks. Supporting national economic development chiefly means gold mine prospecting, preventing and fighting forest fire, participation in key state energy and transportation projects, and emergency rescue and disaster relief in cases of serious calamities.”
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/III.htm
“The People's Armed Police Force
“The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), after a trial period in selected jurisdictions, was officially established at the national level in 1983. In line with the general policy of reducing the size of the armed forces and transferring responsibilities to the civilian sector, the newly established force was formed from internal security units reassigned from the PLA to the Ministry of Public Security and from border defense (customs) and fire-fighting units (see Military Modernization, ch. 14). In 1985 the PAPF consisted of approximately 600,000 volunteers and conscripts. With a general headquarters at the national level and subordinate division-level provincial or specialized units, regimental-level detachments, and battalion-level brigades, it retained its military organization.
“PAPF units assigned to internal security were responsible for guarding party and state organizations and foreign embassies and consulates, as well as for responding to emergencies and maintaining law and order. Border defense units performed standard customs duties, such as inspecting vehicles and ships entering and leaving the country, and maintained surveillance against smugglers and drug traffickers. PAPF firefighting units were responsible for fire-prevention education as well as for fighting fires. PAPF units at every level worked in close cooperation with the armed forces and other public security organizations.”
http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/part5
“V. People's Armed Police Force
“The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) is charged with the fundamental task of safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and contentment. It strives to make itself a powerful, disciplined and politically reliable force.
“Structure and Organization
“As a component of China's armed forces and subordinate to the State Council, the PAPF is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The State Council exercises leadership over the PAPF through relevant functional departments, assigns routine tasks to it, decides its size and number of organizations, and is responsible for its command, operations, and financial and material support. The PAPF has an independent budgetary status in the financial expenditure of the state. The CMC is responsible for the PAPF's organizational structure, management of officers, command, training and political work. It exercises leadership over the PAPF through the four general headquarters/departments. In terms of conducting public security operations and relevant capability building, the PAPF General Headquarters is under the leadership and command of the Ministry of Public Security, and the PAPF units at and below the contingent level are under the leadership and command of the public security organs at the same level. The PAPF has a total force of 660,000.
“The PAPF consists mainly of the internal security force and forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications. The border security, firefighting and security guard forces are also components of the PAPF. The PAPF General Headquarters is the leading and commanding organ that directs and administers the internal security force and forces guarding gold mine, forest, water and electricity, and communications, etc., and provides guidance to other forces subordinate to the PAPF. Under it are the headquarters, political department and logistics department. The PAPF has one commander-in-chief, one first political commissar (assumed concurrently by the Minister of Public Security), one political commissar, and several deputy commanders-in-chief and deputy political commissars. The PAPF internal security force is composed of contingents at the level of the province (autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government) and armed police divisions. Contingents, detachments and squadrons are instituted at the province, prefecture, and county levels, respectively. The armed police divisions have regiments, battalions and companies in battle order, which are stationed in a number of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government. The forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have their own headquarters, which function as their leading and commanding organs. The PAPF General Headquarters has an educational institution directly under it. The contingent headquarters and the headquarters of the forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have elementary command colleges under them.
“Basic Tasks
“In peacetime, the PAPF is tasked to perform guard duties, handle emergencies, combat terrorism, and participate in and support national economic development. In wartime, it assists the PLA in defensive operations.
“Every day, more than 260,000 PAPF servicemen are on guard duty. Through the combined use of manpower, facilities and technologies, the PAPF has effectively enhanced the efficiency of guard duties and security in recent years. The PAPF annually handles an average of over 100 cases of attempted attacks against guarded targets and escape attempts by detained suspects and imprisoned criminals, organizes thousands of important temporary duties, and ensures the security of important international and national conferences and large-scale events, in cooperation with the government departments concerned. Adhering to the guidelines and principles for handling emergencies, and using proper methods and tactics, the PAPF effectively safeguards the fundamental interests of the people, social stability and the dignity of the law. The PAPF anti-terrorism units closely follow the state's anti-terrorism guidelines and principles, and enhance their combat-readiness training. They have been involved in the successful handling of cases of bombing attempts and kidnapping incidents. The various units of the PAPF take an active part in efforts to keep local order, and assist the public security departments in catching and arresting criminal suspects and cracking down on organized criminal gangs.
“The PAPF gold mine force has completed 38 geological prospecting projects in a dozen provinces and autonomous regions, and found some rich gold deposits. In the last two years, the PAPF forest force has put out 552 forest or prairie fires, protecting valuable natural resources. The PAPF water and electricity force has taken part in the construction of 21 key national projects, including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the West-East Natural Gas Transmission Project, the South-North Water Diversion Project, and major hydropower projects. The PAPF communications force is responsible for the maintenance of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway and the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, and has undertaken the construction of national high-grade highways, extra-long tunnels and bridges. Those projects built by the PAPF communications force are all up to standards. In the past two years, 224,000 PAPF troops have participated in 2,320 emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, and rescued and evacuated 250,000 people in disaster-stricken areas.
“Force Building
“The PAPF is working to strengthen itself through science and technology. It is enhancing staff competence, and conducting strict management so that its personnel can fully perform their duties. Using the national information infrastructure, the PAPF has established a preliminary system of three-level integrated information networks, linking general headquarters with the grass-roots squadrons. It has made progress in real-time command and control, management of duties through visual means, networked education and training, and office automation. The PAPF possesses a basically complete range of equipment through R&D and procurement of urgently needed weaponry and equipment. It has set up and improved a distinctive mechanism for the selection, training and employment of officers and NCOs. In particular, priority is given to the training of inter-disciplinary personnel. The PAPF conducts mission-oriented training on a priority basis to better perform guard duties, manage emergencies and combat terrorism. It participated in China's "Great Wall-2003" and "Great Wall II" anti-terrorism exercises, and the SCO's "Joint-2003" exercise, and sponsored the "Guard-04" and "Guard-06" exercises to deal with large-scale emergencies. The PAPF runs its forces strictly and pursuant to the law. It stresses that leaders make decisions, administrative organs conduct management, and officers and men perform their duties strictly in accordance with the law. As a result, its overall performance has been greatly boosted.
“The PAPF is steadily improving its logistical support system based on self-support and supplemented by social and PLA support to raise the efficiency of integrated support. It runs a crisis response support system covering the three echelons of the general headquarters, contingents (divisions) and detachments (regiments), to better respond to emergencies, and unexpected and complex situations. It promotes standardized and institutional logistical management by exploitation of IT and uniformly standardizes its facility configurations, work procedures, operating mechanisms and management requirements. The PAPF is pursuing reforms in housing, procurement of bulk materials and project procurement, medical care, and outsources food, barracks and bedding and clothing services.
“In recent years, the PAPF has conducted friendly exchanges with the armed police forces, military police, internal security forces, public security forces and other similar forces of more than 30 countries to draw on each other's practices and cooperate in conducting anti-terrorism training. Its medical personnel, as part of Chinese rescue teams, have participated in disaster-relief missions in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean.”
Vediamo ora la milizia.
La milizia, con funzioni sia militari che di polizia, consiste di un 10 milioni di miliziani, mobilitabili in qualunque momento per compiti sia di supporto militare che di polizia. Essa, come già la PAPF e le stesse FFAA nel loro complesso, dipende sia dal Governo (State Council) che dalla Commissione Militare Centrale (CMC).
“The Militia
“The militia is an armed mass organization not released from production. It is a reserve force of the PLA and the basis for the prosecution of a people’s war under modern conditions. The General Staff Headquarters administers the building of the militia under the leadership of the State Council and the CMC. Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations, and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in emergency rescue and disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.
“In accordance with provisions in the Military Service Law of the PRC, male citizens from 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for military service, excluding those enlisted for active service, shall be regimented into militia units to perform reserve service. The militia has two categories: the primary and the ordinary. A selected group of militiamen under the age of 28, including soldiers discharged from active service and other persons who have received or are selected for military training, shall be regimented into the primary militia; other male citizens belonging to the age group of 18 to 35, who are qualified for reserve service shall be regimented into the ordinary militia. The primary militia may recruit female citizens when necessary. Rural towns and townships, administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions of a certain scale are the basic units in which the militia is organized. Primary militiamen are separately organized for concentrated military training in militia military training bases of administrative areas at the county level. Currently, there are emergency detachments, and such specialized technical detachments as anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machineguns, portable air defense missiles, ground artillery, communications, chemical defense, engineering and reconnaissance detachments.
“To ensure that militiamen are always ready to respond to the call in case of a contingency, the Chinese government has formulated a militia combat readiness system, whereby combat readiness education is carried out regularly among the militia with the purpose of enhancing their national defense awareness, and exercises are conducted in accordance with combat readiness plans to enhance the militia’s operational capabilities.”
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/III.htm
“Militia Force Building
“China's militia is under the unified direction of the State Council and the CMC, and the dual leadership of local Party committees and governments as well as the military commands. The concept of people's war, and the principle of combining regular work with military training and combining peacetime needs with wartime needs are observed in the building of the militia.
“The focus of the militia work is being shifted from rural areas to cities and areas along communication lines. The setting up of militia forces has expanded from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises and from traditional industries to high-tech industries. Specialized technical units rather than infantry are becoming the backbone of the militia. The proportion of antiaircraft artillery, ground artillery, missile, communications, engineering, anti-chemical, reconnaissance, information and other specialized technical units in the overall militia force is being raised. The building of militia units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force is being strengthened. A new organizational structure of the militia has taken shape, with specialized technical units and units with corresponding specialties serving as the main body, and air defense units, units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and emergency response units playing a leading role.
“The state has increased investment in militia weaponry and equipment, with priority given to equipment for air defense, emergency response and maintenance of stability. The state has phased out a number of out-dated weapons. Militia training reform has been deepened; a four-level system for organizing training is practiced, the four levels being provincial military commands, prefectural military commands, people's armed forces departments of counties (county-level cities or municipal districts) and basic-level people's armed forces departments. Through interlinked training as well as joint training and exercises with active PLA units, the militia has boosted its capabilities of conducting rapid mobilization and carrying out its specialized tasks.”
Quando saranno confrontate a crisi reali ed a combattimenti reali con FFAA moderne, si vedrà se la trasformazione delle FFAA della RPC in FFAA moderne si sarà davvero realizzata. Viste le crescenti tensioni dell’area, non è detto si debba aspettare molto, dopo le olimpiadi del 2008.
China's National Defense in 2006, issued by the Information Office of the State Council People's Republic of China, 29 December 2006,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm
