12 March 2007

Lettera da Lhasa numero 49. Nuovi sviluppi nella dottrina operativa delle FFAA cinesi

Lettera da Lhasa numero 49. Nuovi sviluppi nella dottrina operativa delle FFAA cinesi
by Roberto Scaruffi

Nan Li, New Developments in the PLA’s Operational Doctrine, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 6 (22), 8 November 2006,
http://jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3918&article_id=2371628


Realizzata, almeno in parte, la meccanizzazione della FFAA della RPC, ora l’enfasi in Cina è posta sull’informatizzazione delle stesse. Gli strumenti tecnici sono al servizio, almeno nelle intenzioni dichiarate, di nuovi criteri operativi. Un concetto chiave utilizzato è quello di operazioni congiunte, successivamente divenuto di operazioni congiunte integrate.

Cosi viene rappresentata, dall’autore, la differenza tra le operazioni congiunte, [JO] e operazioni congiunte integrate [IJO]:
“Both JO and IJO involve two or more services, and operations are under a single unified command for the purpose of realizing common objectives. Yet, there are major differences between the two, particularly in terms of primary actors and their structures, service boundaries and identities, coordination, levels/space/timing of operations and operational effects.
“The primary actors of JO, for instance, are relatively independent services. Each of these services possesses its own information system that lacks effective lateral linkages and channels for communications and information transmission. As a result, the structure of this system is vertical, narrow and tall, and JO are based on an ad hoc combination of several tall, smokestack-shaped services. The primary actor of IJO, however, is an integrated system comprised of operating units (land, sea, air, space and electronic warfare) and essential operational elements. These elements include 1) ISR (information, surveillance and reconnaissance) that is space, air, sea and land-based and provides battlefield transparency leading to the precision of decisions and operations; 2) C4 (command, control, communications and computer) that connects the highest command and the lowest individual platform, and soldiers and units of both front and rear; 3) K (kill), or digitized and interconnected weapons platforms that constitute a network of superior firepower capable of non-contact, nonlinear and asymmetrical strikes; and 4) integrated logistics. The technical platform that glues operating units and essential elements together is the unified information network that enables both smooth communications and real-time information transmission through data-links. The structure of such a system is flat, broad and short, mainly because it is networked.”
[...]
“The differences between JO and IJO can also be illustrated in terms of the levels, depth and timing of the operations. In terms of operational levels for JO, due to the lack of precise friend-or-foe identification and precision strikes, a clear line of contact is necessary to differentiate enemy position from one’s own position for air strikes. Once both sides become closely intertwined, the safe distance diminishes and air support becomes difficult for fear of friendly-fire casualties. As a result, air-land operations can only be conducted at campaign and not battle levels. In IJO, however, the issue of enemy identification and precise air strikes has been largely resolved by information technology (IT). As a result, joint operations can be extended to more detailed and narrower domains and be conducted at tactical and battle levels without fear of friendly-fire casualties. This also makes it possible to conduct asymmetrical strikes against the opponent—strikes with technologies that the opponent does not possess and therefore finds difficult to defend against.”
[...]
“The final difference between JO and IJO concerns operational effects. In JO, because of the lack of IT-based integration, competition largely takes place at the unit level. As a result, operations tend to be more separate, the process slower and dispersed, and the effects more fragmented. Due to the high level of IT-driven integration, however, competition in IJO takes place at the system level. As a result, operations tend to be more focused and purposeful, the pace faster and the effects more systemic and comprehensive. The absence and presence of highly effective, integrative C4KISR is clearly the key variable that accounts for the differences between JO and IJO: serious gaps or windows of vulnerabilities in operational levels, depth and timing due to the lack of integration in the former and seamlessness due to a high level of integration in these three aspects for the latter.”

Secondo l’autore, solo con Jiang Zemin cominciò la vera modernizzazione della FFAA della RPC, in parallelo con la loro stretta subordinazione la potere politico. “While Jiang had largely won the political loyalty of the generals by increasing defense spending and promoting several of them to higher ranks, Jiang did not want the generals to meddle in party and government affairs, which would complicate his image and position as an effective leader.” [...] “Therefore, Jiang endorsed two new military policies since 1998, the first of which was to order the PLA to divest its business activities. The second was to promote the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the PLA, as an effective way to focus the attention of the generals on the narrow military-technical issues rather than on the broader area of civilian politics.”

L’evoluzione delle FFAA delle RPC in vere FFAA moderne dipende dalla continuazione della modernizzazione della RPC e dalla dispobilità e possibilità del potere politico di continuare a finanziare generosamente le FFAA stesse. In effetti, gli incrementi di spesa nel settore militare, annunciati successivamente alla data del presente saggio, sembrano indicare questa persistente volontà.


NOTA:
According to http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/C4KISR , the meaning of C4KISR is Command Control Communications Computers Kill Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance.


Nan Li, New Developments in the PLA’s Operational Doctrine, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 6 (22), 8 November 2006,
http://jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3918&article_id=2371628